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Abstract- A stable electricity supply is vitalfor modern society. used to distribute power evenly through the entire system,
However, many parts of our power transmission grid are operating however, due to deregulation there is incentive for transmission
near their operational limits. Such stressed systems are vulnerable operators to operate as near capacity as possible. This allows
to cascading failures, where a few small faults can induce a operator too e anrcapct as possiblets al
cascade of failures potentially leading to a major blackout. The excess power to be purchased from distant markets, but at
Unified Power Flow Controller (UPFC), the most powerful high- the expense of reduced system stability margins. For the
speed, semi-conductor based power flow device, can be used as foreseeable future the power industry will be able to produce
a theoretical model to study how these devices can be used to enough power to meet customer demands, however, the current
improve power grid resilience. The blueprint presented here can be transmission grid may be operating so close to its limits that
used to iteratively identify critical weaknesses in power grids and to
recommend a means offixing these weaknesses via the installation ansmalsful coudcaueawblacutw[7].
of UPFCs. This approach to hardening the power transmission grid Transmission grids have two features which make them
will make it less prone to blackouts and better able to forestall or prone to catastrophic failure. First, because transmission lines
reduce the severity of unavoidable blackouts. often cross vast, unmonitored space, they are susceptible to
Keywords: Critical Infrastructure Protection, Power Grid, both natural failures (ice, wind damage, tree contact) and
FACTS, UPFC, Evolutionary Algorithm intentional disruption (terrorist attack). Second, when a trans-
mission line fails, the power which it was carrying flows over
1 Introduction other lines. In a system where many components are already
Modern industrialized society has become dependent on operating near their limits, the additional demands following
electric power. In fact, in a report to the President of the a failure can cause other components to fail. The induced
United States, the U.S. Department of Energy said "Electricity failures can, in turn, induce additional failures that eventually
is a cornerstone on which the economy and the daily lives lead to a domino effect that causes a blackout.
of our nation's citizens depend. This essential commodity Power flow in the transmission grid today is largely dictated
has no substitute" [7]. Not only does electric power directly by Ohm's laws: power flows along the path of least resistance.
provide heating, lighting and the power that drives manufac- Historically, the flow of power has been controlled by adjust-
turing plants, but it is also a vital resource on which other ing where the power is being generated and by "compensating"
infrastructures, including water distribution, sewage treatment the lines, where electromechanical devices physically add or
and removal, emergency services, and traffic flow control, remove components to change line impedances. Although
rely. Unfortunately, power grids all over the world are facing this was satisfactory when the grid was operating well be-
conditions which may jeopardize their ability to satisfy future low its maximum capacity, as the grid becomes increasingly
demand for power as well as making them a target for terrorist overburdened it becomes vital to have better control over
attack. the flow of power to help mitigate cascading outages by
Electric power is produced at large generating facilities and directing power flow away from components that are near
then "transmitted" over a system known as the transmission their failure point. By using automatic control algorithms and
grid to regional distribution systems. The transmission grid, high-speed, accurate power flow control in key locations, it
which consists of many long-distance, high-voltage lines and may be possible to mitigate or at least reduce the severity of
the buses to which they are connected, is really at the heart of cascading outages. Having this additional control may also be
the electric power industry. The transmission grid is the fun- a vital element for defending power systems against deliberate
damental link between power producers and consumers, and, physical and cyber attack.
unfortunately, is becoming increasingly overburdened. Over The power grid is considered to be a significant target for
the past decade demand for electricity has steadily increased terrorist attack because, due to its large scale, it is susceptible
and deregulation has spurred increased power transfers, but to a number of different attacks including: physical destruction
due to environmental, economic, and social concerns, the of lines, physical control of a substation or generating facility,
transmission grid has had relatively few upgrades. As a result, and cyber attacks on control and communication systems. Due
many of the components are operating near their intended to the sheer size of the system it is impossible to effectively
capacity. Prior to deregulation a top-down approach could be protect all the physical components, and due to the complex
1-4244-1 160-2/07/$25.OO ©2007 IEEE.
control interactions of the different companies and components weight causing it to break, much like a fuse. Either of these
in the system a comprehensive cyber defense is also infeasible. failures is due to carrying above average current for a sustained
In addition to being vulnerable, the power grid makes a period (several seconds to hours). Sagging into trees was the
tantalizing terrorist target due to the havoc that follows even most significant contributor to the North American blackout
a short disruption. This was particularly evident following the of 2003 [7]. In that case, failure to maintain properly trimmed
August 2003 blackout that effected a significant region of trees, rather than excessive line sag, was the major cause of
North America. In addition to the financial losses incurred due failure.
to business closings, a number of vital services including 911 UPFCs are studied here primarily because they offer a
service, sewage treatment, and water service were lost due comprehensive means of power flow control, being able to
to their reliance on electricity. Moreover, there is evidence control both real and reactive power flow as well as being
that grid attacks are actively being investigated by terrorist able to regulate bus voltage. UPFCs have a total of twelve
organizations. In a statement to the joint subcommittee of the different forms of control [8] and represent a super set of
House of Representatives, Christopher Cox, a representative the capabilities of other devices in the FACTS family as well
from the state of California, reported that "Al-Qaida computers as high speed versions of more traditional electromechanical
seized in Afghanistan in 2001 had logged on to sites offering means of control. For the work proposed here, the ideal control
that offer [sic] software and programming instructions for mode is unknown a priori, and, more importantly, may be
the distributed control systems (DCS) and Supervisory-control different for different system vulnerabilities. I.e., under one
and Data-acquisition (SCADA) systems that run power, water, type of failure the UPFCs may be best used for power flow
transport and communications grids. [6]" regulation and in another scenario additional voltage support
may be more important. A theoretical UPFC provides an ideal
model of control capabilities because, with the appropriate
In an effort to help better control power flow, the Electric control algorithm, it can seamlessly change control modes
Power Research Institute (EPRI) sponsored an initiative to to suit the current situation. The plan presented here can be
develop a new class of power control devices called Flexible used to indicate where system vulnerabilities exist and further
AC Transmission System (FACTS) devices. These devices, studies can easily identify the specific form of device (UPFC,
which are based on recent improvements in semi-conductor other FACTS, or traditional means) to provide the best cost
technology, can be used to help solve a variety of power con- benefit for system defense.
trol problems. By using the latest semi-conductor technology, 1 2
these devices are able to control AC power in a substantially Using UPFCs for Critical Infrastructure Protection
new way which is both faster and more precise than previous The remainder of the paper looks at three inter-connected
techniques. problems: 1) identifying the kinds of attacks the power grid
One of the most powerful forms of FACTS device is the is susceptible to, 2) finding installation locations that allow a
Unified Power Flow Controller (UPFC). As its name suggests, few UPFCs to substantially reduce the likelihood of cascading
its primary role is to provide control over power flow. A UPFC failures, and 3) modeling the elements necessary to simulate
is installed on a specific power line and provides almost total both simple cascading failures and the control capabilities
control over the power flowing through that line. Due to the of UPFCs. Each of these topics alone presents a complex
nature of electric power flow, increasing or decreasing the flow problem and the approach presented here is not intended to
through one line has an ancillary effect on the lines to which be a panacea to solve all power grid vulnerabilities. Instead,
it is connected. This allows a single UPFC to have significant a simplistic approach is outlined to explore the feasibility and
impact: it can be used to increase power flow through a line potential impact of the use of FACTS devices for a specific
and potentially draw excess power away from "upstream" lines type of system vulnerability. Following the feasibility study,
that are operating over capacity, or it can restrict power flow detailed analysis can be performed to determine the real-
and reduce the load on "down stream" lines. Due to high world applicability of the results. Essentially the technique
installation cost it is impractical to install more than a few can be used to provide some recommended solutions to a
UPFCs in a system, but a few devices cooperatively using their very complicated problem, which system engineers can then
ancillary impact may provide enough regulation to redirect evaluate and refine.
power flow and avoid or at least reduce the overload on critical The approach presented here is based on a game-theory
lines. model of attackers and defenders and requires iterative cycles
Although UPFCs can be used to mitigate a variety of of simulated attacks. As such, a power system simulation that
operating conditions, the work here focuses on finding ways models the most significant features of both cascading failures
to relieve or at least reduce the severity of cascading outages. and UPFCs is required. The simulation will be used in two
The most significant cascading outages are a direct result ways: the first will identify the attacks to which the system
of transmission lines carrying higher-than-normal amounts of is highly vulnerable and the second is used to find ways for
current, which causes the metal to expand and sag. A failure UPFCs to mitigate the attacks. By repeating the two cycles
occurs when the line either sags into contact with a ground it will be possible to incrementally harden the system against
source, such as a tree, or weakens to the point of its own the most probable attacks and failures.
2 Iterative Hardening that exhibit these properties. EAs are loosely based on the con-
The proposed technique for identifying system vulnerabil- cept of Darwinian evolution. Problem solutions are encoded in
ities and potential ways to rectify them is based on a basic individuals (in our case a list of line outages). A population of
game theory approach similar to that proposed in [1]. In this several individuals is "evolved" by iteratively applying a fixed
approach, two distinct games are played: one by an attacker cycle of evolutionary operations. At each iteration, the fitness
and one by a defender. of all members of the population is determined by measuring
how good each member is relative to the others using (1).
2.1 The Attacker's Game The evolutionary operators are: (1) selecting individuals for
The goal of the attacker's game is to identify the brittle reproduction with a bias towards fitter individuals, (2) applying
areas in the network. The actual goal of the attacker is to cause variation mechanisms inspired by biological systems such as
the most damage with the least effort. Ideally the attacker will recombination (implements II) and mutation (implements I),
select a few lines that will cause a total blackout. The attacker's (3) selecting individuals to survive to the next cycle from the
game can be thought of as a simple discrete maximization combined "adult" individuals and their offspring, with a bias
problem, such as: towards fitter individuals, The evolutionary cycle continues
until a suitable termination condition has been achieved, such
arg max F (0, Q) -F (a, Q) + G (a, ) (1) as reaching a performance plateau.
where: 2.2 The Defender's Game
a is the attack plan, a schedule of what lines to remove
and when to remove them Since the end goal is to demonstrate that UPFCs can defend
/3 is a set of parameters for the power system, including the system against the weaknesses identified by the attacker,
load profiles the defender's goal is to minimize the system's brittleness,
F(a, Q) is a function that simulates the power system and which can also be expressed as a discrete maximization
determines the total amount of power delivered problem:
G(a, Q) is a reward function for encouraging the simpler argmax E [F (a,3) + H(Q3)] (3)
attacks. Q is included so that parameters of the power
system, such as line length and location, may be used Where H(Q) is a reward function that encourages using as
evaluate the complexity. few UPFCs as possible, the expectation is taken over a set of
The term F (0, Q) - F (a, Q) measures the amount of power likely attacks, and only the components of 3 that correspond
delivery lost due to the attack. The reward function, G(a, 3) to UPFC locations can be changed. By maximizing (3), the
may also be dependent on the degree of power loss, so a three defender is selecting places to install UPFCs that maximize
step plan may be preferred to a two step plan if the increase in the amount of power delivered over all the attacks to which
damage is substantial. This maximization problem represents the system was the most vulnerable.
the typical intent of a malicious attack (maximal damage with The set of potential attacks will be taken directly from the
minimal effort). (Note that the value of F (0, Q) is constant) best solutions to the Attacker's Game, and the probability of
Power system parameters and operating conditions are their incidence can be based on the same ranking used by
nearly impossible to predict in advance, so the game can either the attacker (their complexity, G (a, )) or may assume that
assume that: 1) the attacker will try to take advantage of a peak the probability of attack is related to the amount of damage
load time and assume a specified worst case Q, or 2) that 3 incurred (F (0, Q) - F (a, Q)). The latter corresponds to a
can be considered a random variable and, at the expense of mini-max game, where the defender minimizes the damage
considerably more computation, the expectation can be used: done by the attacker's best possible attacks.
Selecting installation locations for UPFCs is also a com-
arg max E [F (0, Q) - F (a, Q) + G (a, 3)] (2) binatorial problem with no known, optimal solution, but, as
with selecting attacks, random variation and combination ofExhaustive search can be used to find the most significant goo souin .a'il bte ouin,so gi,a Ai
attacks on small systems, but unfortunately the problem search . . . ' ' '.
' . . .............. a good mechanism to select installation configurations. This
space grows exponentially with the attack size, so it is in-
' assumes that all the installed UPFCs operate optimally withfeasible for large systems. At this time, there are no efficient
'. ~~~~respect to the performance criteria, which will be covered intechniques known for optimal search of this problem; however, Sectio 3.3.
some important observations can be made: 1) It is expected
that changing a single element of an attack may make the 2 3 Iterative Hardening
attack incrementally better, but there is no known method of
identifying which change is optimal without exhaustive search Defending against a single attack alone does not provide
and 2) It is expected that mixing elements of two good attacks any significant improvement in fault tolerance if there are
may yield a better attack other attacks of nearly equal complexity and damage. The
A technique known as an Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) is an real goal is to demonstrate that a few well placed UPFCs can
ideal candidate for searching large combinatorial search spaces substantially harden power grids.
System Configuration
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l(one iteration of genetic algorithm)l
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\ met? / °Bs Best
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Attacker \/ ), ) Attacks
Perform a Defefnder Iteration
l(one iteration of genetic algorithm) UPFC)Istlato
Installation
Locations




Defender < 4) Provide a distinct means of comparing the quality of
different attacks and different defenses
5) Be as accurate a model as an actual attacker would be
Update Reward Functions likely to use
The first four criteria can be met via modification to a
traditional power system technique known as Loadflow. The
erminatin
\fifth criteria is subjective, however the form of simulation
<Criteria > No presented here is based on common analysis techniques used
\met? / by power engineers to determine system faults and is one of
the most likely starting places for a vulnerability assessment.
Moreover, all the information required for this type of attack
simulation would be readily available to a potential attacker.
Fig. 1. Computational Flow Chart of Attacker and Defender Algorithms
3.1 Power System Steady-State Model
The attacker's EA is designed to find the simplest significant The most straight forward approach to steady-state power
faults, while the defender's EA is designed to install the fewest system simulation is a technique known as Loadflow. Loadflow
number ofrdevices necessary to significantly hardn te g models a power system as a collection of buses, which cannumb to significantly de he rid be eihragnrtr oe csoe,o oh n e
aganstthoe ataks.Sine te ttakers coies illchagebe either a generator, a power customer, or both, and a setagainst those attacks. Sinc he a tac r' ho ces will change of poe lie oncigtebse oehr tec u
based on the system configuration, these two algorithms need
to be run in an iterative cycle to incrementally improve the there are four state variables, and, depending on the specific
system. combination of generators and power consumers at the bus,two of the state variables are known and the other two areThe attacker's algorithm will provide an adequate source
of attacks for each potential system configuration, while the unknown. Loadflow is merely a technique that solves for the
defender's algorithm will continually improve the system unknown state variables. The four state variables are:delellder~ ~~~~ ~~~~~~~h rea powertN loll athul busoetnysedefenses in order to escalate the complexity of significant Pi the real power load at bus j
attacks. As such, it is expected that both the reward functions Qj, the reactive power load at bus j
will need to be "cooled" as the two algorithms alternate back ve,j the real component of the voltage at bus j, Re{Vj}
and forth to allow for increasingly complicated attacks and Vh,j the reactive component of voltage at bus j,
increasing numbers of FACTS installations. Fig. 1 shows a Imag{§V }
flow chart of the sequence in which the two algorithms will Note that the voltage is a sinusoidal signal and can be
be used and Fig. 2 shows the basic data flow. represented in polar form with a magnitude, VE l, and a phase
3 Simulation angle (relative to a reference bus), ZVj. For the version of
Loadflow used here the voltage is converted to rectangular
An accurate simulation of the power system, represented form, Ve,j + Vhj. There are three types of buses in the system,
by the function F(a,/3) above, is vital in order to achieve and the type of bus indicates which variables are known and
meaningful results. To be useful, the simulation must: which are unknown:
1) Be fast enough for repeated evaluations needed by a BA Generator Buses are directly connected to a large genera-
2) Be able to simulate line failures tor. It is assumed that the power, Pj, and voltage, vj, at these
3) Be able to simulate all twelve UPFC control modes as buses is constant due to the generator. The reactive power
well as install and remove UPFCs supplied by the generator, Qj, and the phase angle of the
voltage, &j, are unknown. Note that there are practical limits Initialize State Variables to Best Guess
or Nominal Values
on the amount of reactive power a generator can supply, which
are enforced by the simulation described here. Computer Mismatch in Equalities
Load Buses represent the bulk of the buses in a system,
which have a known real power load, Pj, and a known reactive
power load, Qj. Generally these represent the load being used All Mismatch Yes
by customers but may also represent power being injected into
T FwaTrt
the system that cannot be explicitly represented as a generator
(discussed later). The voltage, vj, and phase angle of the 0
voltage, 6j, are unknown. BuildJacobian
The Slack Bus is a special generator in the system which
is used: 1) as a reference against which all other phase angles
are measured (Q, = 0 by definition), and 2) as a supply for Solve Linear System (LU Decomposition)
additional real power to make up for system losses. At all
other buses a known power is either injected or withdrawn, ApplyUpdatetoEstimateofState
however the power lines themselves require power to operate.
The slack bus represents a "free" source of real power (the '
slack) to make up for the power consumed by the transmission Reactive Limits
system itself, known as system losses.
Power systems are governed by Kirchhoff's power laws, CheckforSingularity
which ensure that the sum of the power at a bus is zero. I.e., the and Shed Load
power that enters the bus must also leave the bus. Kirchhoff's
laws for an AC transmission grid can be represented as one set Fig. 3. The Newton-Raphson Loadflow Estimation Process
of equations for the real component of power and a second set
for either the reactive component or voltage depending on the
type of bus. All buses except the slack bus must have balanced Since each bus has an equation for real power (Pj) and
real power: either an equation for reactive power (Qj) or an equation for
voltage magnitude ( Vj ), there are a total of 2N quadratic
buses equations and 2N unknowns for a system with N buses.
Pi -ve,j E3 (gi,kVe,k - bj,kVh,k) The system of equations is generally solved via the Newton-
k Raphson method, which uses the first-order Taylor series
buses approximation of (4), (5), and (6) to iteratively update an
Vh,j E (gj,kVh,k + bj,kVe,k) 0 (4) estimate of the values of the unknown variables.
k The Newton-Raphson method starts with an initial guess of
state variables, which is either based on a prior known stateQbusvesj1: (gi,kVh,k + bj,kVe,k) or specified nominal values. The iterative process then updatesQj +Ve,j E (Yj,kVh,k + bj,kVe,k) these values until the error in the equalities of (4), (5), and (6)
bLses are within an appropriate error tolerance.
+Vh,J 1 (Yj,kVe,k - bj,kVh,k) 0 (5) A basic Loadflow algorithm which relies on the Newton-
k Raphson technique is shown in Fig. 3. The Newton-Raphson
technique is commonly used in power systems for a variety
while the generator buses have a constant voltage: of reasons:
V- (v2 + v 0 (6) 1) State variables are generally close to either a known or
a nominal value, so it is easy to select an "initial guess"
for state variables,
gj,k the conductance from bus j to bus k 2) the technique generally has quadratic convergence, and
bj,k the susceptance from bus j to bus k hence only requires a few iterations,
Note that subscript e indicates the real component of a 3) the power flow equations are sinusoidal in nature and
complex variable and the subscript h indicates the imaginary are well behaved with regard to minor perturbations,
component of a complex variable. (4) assures everything but 4) in the Newton-Raphson method, the power flow equa-
the slack bus meets Kirchhoff's law for real power. (5) ensures tions are a sparse, linear system and the underlying
that load buses meet Kirchhoff's law for reactive power as techniques, such as using LU decomposition, are com-
well, while (6) ensures that generators, which generate an putationally efficient.
unknown amount of reactive power and thus violate (5), Generators produce both real power, which can be used for real
operate at a fixed voltage, work, and a form of oscillating power called reactive power.
Reactive power is a vital component of AC power systems constraint equations, so the original assumptions on load and
and may be either consumed or produced by the power lines generation must be changed to bring the system back to a
themselves, as well as by generators or customers. As power solvable state. In systems losing transmission facilities the
lines fail, other lines begin to transfer the excess power and most common problem is having a load bus who's lines can
may require additional reactive power to do so. The generators not carry enough power to satisfy the specified demand, Pj.
in the system both produce or consume reactive power to To bring the system back to a solvable state some of the load
ensure that the total reactive power in the system is balanced, must be shed (reduce Pj). In the framework devised here, the
however each generator has a limit on the amount of reactive attackers must assume, as in typical min-max game theory,
power it can supply or absorb. Since reactive power demands that the defender will make optimal choices with the resources
change as the system loading changes during outages, it is available. Thus ideally both the attackers and defenders will
vital to be able to honor the reactive generation limits of the assume that only the minimum amount of load necessary will
system's generators. A common method to enforce these limits be shed to bring the system back to a solvable state.
is to monitor the reactive power each generator is supplying A mechanism for optimal updates of the state variables,
on each iteration of the Newton-Raphson loop. If a generator which can also be used to detect an ill-conditioned system,
exceeds either the minimum or maximum reactive generation was proposed in [2]. The authors noticed that, when using the
limit, the generator bus is changed to a load bus with Pj set rectangular formulation of power flow as given previously, the
to correspond to the power injected by the generator, Qj set complete Taylor series expansion only requires three terms.
to correspond to the maximum amount of reactive power that Moreover, these terms have a particularly efficient form and,
the generator can absorb or consume depending on which limit most importantly, an exact solution can be found via the
was exceeded and the voltage. The voltage vj then becomes use of an appropriately chosen scalar multiplier. The optimal
an unknown variable. multiplier is easy to compute and provides a substantial
3.2 Detecting and Enforcing Convergence improvement
in system solvability.
In [3], Overbye notes that the solvable region of the state
As lines are removed from the system, two significant space is separated from the unsolvable region by a border
problems may occur, either of which can prevent traditional on which the Jacobian used in the Newton-Raphson process
Loadflow techniques from working: islanding and exceeding becomes singular. When the system is solvable, the optimal
system capacity. multiplier remains near unity. Overbye also shows that infea-
Islanding is where separate "islands" develop which effec- sible systems can be detected by monitoring the magnitude of
tively separate the system into multiple independent systems. the optimal multiplier [3] . When it is sufficiently small, no
Typically when this occurs at least one of the newly formed state assignments will be able to satisfy the load demands of
systems will be unable to meet the equality constraints. There the system and load shedding must be performed.
are three possible cases: 1) islands that lack a swing bus and In [4], an extension of [3], a technique was proposed to
have no mechanism to compensate for the real-power losses in bring the system back to an optimal solvable point with a load
the lines, 2) islands that have load but no generation can not shedding technique that maximizes the amount of demand that
satisfy customer demand, and 3) islands that have generation can be met. This optimal load shedding relies on the use of
but no load have a surplus of power with no consumers. the optimal multiplier technique to bring unsolvable systems
Islanding can be easily detected and corrected via graph back to the solvable boundary.
traversal. A simple mechanism starts from an arbitrary bus and Although this optimal form of load shedding may not
recursively visits all unvisited buses to which it is connected, be in use on a given power system, it is unlikely that an
marking each as visited. If, upon completion, any unvisited attacker would know the exact load shedding capabilities
buses exist then the visited group represents a new island, and procedures, so they would assume a conservative case.
and the process is repeated with the first unvisited bus. This By using the optimal load shedding, the attacker's mini-max
process is repeated until all nodes are assigned to islands. perception, i.e., that the system will be as well defended as
When complete, islands with only generators or only loads possible, is maintained.
are discarded. Any remaining islands that lack a slack bus are
modified so that the largest generator in each becomes a slack 33 UPFC Model
bus. A perfect model of a UPFC consists of a voltage source
Exceeding capacity is when the system is not physically connected to a bus in shunt and another voltage source
able to transmit power in a way that satisfies all the constraints connected in series with a line. The only constraints imposed
(the power flow constraints of (4), (5), and (6) as well as the on the model are the magnitude of the shunt voltage source,
generator reactive limits). which is typically near the magnitude of the source bus, and
In many cases the constraint equations cannot be met that the real power injected or consumed by the series source
because the system no longer has the physical ability to carry must be supplied by the shunt source, which ensures there is
enough power to satisfy the load being demanded. When this no net real power injected into the system.
happens the original assumptions about the known variables The typical UPFC model has twelve unique forms of
are incorrect and no values of state variables can meet the control and typical Loadflow implementations assume that
one particular mode will be used [8]. In the plan presented
Adjust For Optimalhere, the desired control mode is unknown and may change UPFC Settings
depending on the conditions of the system, so a simpler model
is used in which the shunt voltage, series voltage, and series
phase angle are specified directly. The shunt phase angle is left Loadflow
free to ensure that the shunt can meet the power consumption
demands of the series source.
The UPFC model used here is novel in two respects: 1) Compute Line Outagesand Power Delivered
it does not assume the control mode, allowing for the UPFC
to change operating modes in different simulated scenarios to
achieve optimal control for each, and 2) the rectangular coor-
dinate system is used to comply with the optimal multiplier Optimal UPFC No
method, which is used to allow for optimal load shedding. Settings Found?
The optimal settings for the UPFCs can be found via simple Remove Line,
Fio islands,
optimization of a metric that will ensure maximal power Yes Update Line Failure Times,
8f \ ~~~~Accumulate Power Delivered /delivery prior to failure. Prior work has shown that sequential j \ DeXee
quadratic programming is sufficient to directly find UPFC
settings for a simpler model [5], however it is expected that illalinefail?
the same technique will apply to this more general model.
3.4 Line Failure 0
Line failures, the prime component of cascading outages,
occur because of excessive current overheating power lines, MoreAttacker Ye
which eventually sag to the point that they either contact a Outages?
ground source or physical failure. A simple line model has
two parameters for each line: 1) a maximum current rating
which it can safely carry and 2) a maximum ampacity, or
cumulative current, that can be carried when the current rating Fig. 4. Power System Simulation for Cascading Failures
is exceeded. The time until a line fails can be calculated
based on the results of the Loadflow. For each line which
is exceeding its current rating, the failure time is the amount the basic ideas presented are sound. Future work will focus
of "remaining ampacity" divided by the current through the on utilizing more realistic models of the UPFC and qualitative
line. The "remaining ampacity" continually diminishes until analysis of the results.
either the line fails, or the line is no longer exceeding capacity
and has had suitable time to "cool" to relieve the excess heat eferences
generated. [1] V. M. Bier. Game-Theoretic and Reliability Methods in Counter-Terrorism
and Security, chapter 3, pages 23-42. World Scientific Publishing Co,
3.5 Smlto Ovriw2005.3.5Simulation Overview [2] S. Iwamoto and Y. Tamura. A load flow calculation method for ill-
The full power system simulation overview can be seen in conditioned power systems. IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and
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